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CASE COMMENTS
SOLE PROPRIETOR AS DEFENDANT AND
"ENTERPRISE" UNDER RICO
United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986)
In United States v. Benny' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit further defined the "associated with" requirement of
RICO, 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c),2 by indicating that a sole proprietor
can associate with his own proprietorship so long as the "enterprise" 3
can be separated from the individual, either by formal incorporation4 or
where other people work for the proprietor.5
George Benny, sole proprietor of "George I. Benny," was convicted
under RICO provision 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c).6 The indictment al-
leged schemes to defraud institutional lenders.7 Benny argued that the
RICO conviction should be reversed because the defendant or "person" 8
and the "enterprise"9 cannot be the same individual.1
1. 786 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises' affairs through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
3. See infra note 9.
4. See infra note 62.
5. 786 F.2d 1410, 1414-16.
6. 786 F.2d 1410, 1413. In addition to the RICO count, the jury convicted Benny of twenty-
one counts of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341-42 (1984).
7. Id. Benny's sole proprietorship engaged, inter alia, in the acquisition and management of
real estate. His schemes involved defrauding institutional lenders in the financing of a northern
California apartment building and a planned community to be built on a Nevada Ranch. Benny
either employed or associated with four other defendants, each of whom pleaded guilty to lesser
charges in exchange for their testimony against Benny.
8. RICO defines "person" as including "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1984 & Supp. 1988).
9. RICO defines "enterprise" to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any unions or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1984 & Supp. 1988). See United States v. Parnes, 305 F.2d 430
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (the Second Circuit Court of Appeals first dealt
with the scope of the term "enterprise"). See generally Note, The Enterprise Element in RICO: A
Proposed Interpretation, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 123 (1980) (distinction must be made between de
facto associational enterprise and legal entity enterprise). See also Woodbridge, RICO: The Corpora-
tion as "Enterprise" and Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 503, 505 (1983) ("the enterprise element is
the cornerstone of RICO").
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Benny appealed his conviction in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.'1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and held: a sole pro-
prietor may be convicted under RICO section 1962(c) where the sole
proprietorship is the "enterprise" with which the defendant proprietor
"associates," if the proprietorship is incorporated or the proprietor has
other employees. 12
To be convicted under RICO section 1962(c) a "person" must be em-
ployed by or "associated with" an "enterprise" that uses interstate com-
merce for racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 3 The
RICO statute includes both formal and informal organizations in its defi-
nition of enterprise.14 Most RICO litigation involves defining "enter-
prise" because the concept of "enterprise" is the hub of a RICO
conviction. 5 The Benny case, however, focuses on the parameters of the
phrase "associates with" in the context of section 1962. The central issue
of the Benny decision, and a theoretical question rarely discussed by
courts and commentators, is how a sole proprietor can associate with his
own business within the meaning of section 1962.
Congress enacted RICO in 197016 to give new strength to the govern-
ment's crusade against organized crime and its economic roots. 17
Notwithstanding this legislative intent, the government prosecuted few
RICO cases following RICO's enactment. 18 This trend ended in 1975
when the head of a Justice Department strike force lectured to United
States Attorneys on the potential use of the statute. 9 Much of the RICO
litigation since 1975 has focused on section 1962.20
10. 786 F.2d 1410, 1414-16. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
11. United States v. Benny, 559 F. Supp. 264, 265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
12. 786 F.2d at 1414-16.
13. See infra note 17.
14. See 1 K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 7:03 (1984).
15. Id.
16. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) was enacted as Title IX
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 922, 941-44
(1970).
17. Russello v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1983).
18. 1 K. BRICKEY, supra note 14, § 7:01.
19. Id.
20. "Section 1962 defines four distinct RICO offenses:
§ 1962(a) prohibits investment of income that is derived directly or indirectly from a pat-
tern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt.
§ 1962(b) prohibits acquisition or maintenance of an interest in or control of an enterprise
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce.
§ 1962(c) prohibits those who are employed by or associated with enterprises that are en-
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The Supreme Court first addressed RICO21 in United States v.
Turkette.2 2 In Turkette the Court established the standard by which
courts should interpret the statute, and delved into its own interpretation
of section 1962(c).23 In holding that a RICO enterprise includes legal as
well as illegal entities,24 the Court stated that the RICO statute should be
liberally construed to accomplish its remedial purposes in fighting organ-
ized crime.25 The court also indicated that an "enterprise" is not a "pat-
tern of racketeering activity" under section 1962(c), but is an entity
separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages.26
This "separate entity" requirement has led to unresolved confusion
among the circuits.27
Turkette gave rise to the much litigated issue of whether a corporation
may be simultaneously both a defendant and the enterprise under section
1962(C). 28 The circuits differ in their resolution of this issue.29 The Elev-
enth Circuit, in United States v. Hartley,3" held that a corporation may be
gaged in or that affect commerce from conducting or participating, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or
unlawful debt collection.
§ 1962(d) makes conspiracy to commit any substantial RICO violation an independent
punishable offense."
1 K. BRICKEY, supra note 14, § 7:02. See also Woodbridge, supra note 9, at 504 ("RICO punishes as
defendants those persons who commit predicate offenses in connection with the enterprise").
21. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 579 (1980). The original indictment charged the
defendant and 12 others as an "enterprise" (a group of individuals associated in fact) with, inter alia,
conspiring to distribute narcotics.
22. The other important Supreme Court case dealing with RICO is Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (failed attempt to narrow RICO elements by imposing a "racketeering
enterprise injury" requirement on top of the statutory requirement of showing of injury resulting
from an enterprise being conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity). For a discussion of
Sedima and Turkette, see Papal v. Gremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
23. See supra notes 2, 14 and 15.
24. White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting statement.
25. 452 U.S. at 587. The Court quoted from § 904(a) of RICO, 84 Stat. 947. See supra note 17
(Congress envisioned a broad reading of RICO).
26. 452 U.S. at 583.
27. See generally Woodbridge, supra note 9.
28. K. BRICKEY, supra note 14, § 7:03.1.
29. See infra notes 31 and 36.
30. 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982). Defendants were convicted before the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida of conspiracy, mail fraud, violations of the National Stolen
Property Act and RICO. The RICO conviction was for defrauding the United States Department of
Defense by intentionally supplying it with frozen shrimp that did not conform to military contract
specifications.
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both a defendant and the enterprise under section 1962(c).31 Turkette
requires proof of the corporation as a separate entity from the enterprise.
The Hartley court, however, decided that the existence of the corpora-
tion, in and of itself, proved the separate enterprise element.3 2 Commen-
tators favor the Eleventh Circuit's holding; however, only this circuit
takes such an approach. 3
In a decision reached at virtually the same time as Hartley, the Fourth
Circuit decided in United States v. Computer Sciences Corporation,3 4 that
the "enterprise" must be something different from the RICO defend-
ant.35 In explaining why an unincorporated division of a company could
not conspire with its parent company, the court reasoned that a person
cannot conspire with himself.36 Thus, because the court found that the
unincorporated division was a part of the parent corporation, the court
discharged the corporation's section 1962(c) liability.3 7 Although Com-
puter Sciences has attracted a great deal of criticism, 3 8 a majority of the
31. Id. at 988-90. See supra notes 8-9. See generally Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennet v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 286-325 (1982) (discussing
distinction between "enterprise" and "person").
32. 678 F.2d 961, 988-90. The court gave three rationales for its holding: 1) evidence of the
defendant's corporate existence would satisfy the enterprise element separate and apart from the
other statutory requirements; 2) the problem would not have come about if the government had
"charged the defendants collectively as an 'association in fact' and charged the defendant corpora-
tion singly as the enterprise." Id.; and 3) under "basic corporations law" the court could "pierce the
Corporate Veil" and "view Treasure Isle... in a different light for each of the roles it assumes in this
case." Id. See Haas, Criminal Law I, 59 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1243, 1262 (1984). See also K. BRICKEY,
supra note 14, § 7:03.
33. See Blakey, supra note 31, at n.181. ("Hartley is a thoughtful, well-reasoned opinion. .
See also Woodbridge, supra note 9, at 523. ("the strong anticrime stance adopted by Congress mili-
tates in favor of allowing prosecutors to indict corporations as defendants under RICO.") But see
Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 345 n.232 ("United States v. Hartley is characterized
by superficial and unpersuasive reasoning.")
34. 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982). Hartley was decided on June 17, 1982, while Computer
Science was decided on June 16, 1982. (Computer Science involved criminal action brought against a
corporation and six defendants for alleged RICO offenses, wire fraud, mail fraud, and making false
claims to United States Government.)
35. Id. at 1190. ("A corporation, in common parlance, is not regarded as distinct from its
unincorporated divisions either.")
36. Id. For the definition of "person," see supra note 8.
37. Id.
38. See Woodbridge, supra note 9, at 521-22. (The author claims that the court's holding in
Computer Science that the RICO enterprise must be something different from the persons whose
behavior the act was designed to prohibit is unsupported. The author supports Hartley as having
"delved more deeply into the logic of the situation and reached a solution compatible with RICO
policy as well as corporate law principles.") See also K. BRICKEY, supra note 14, § 7:03 at n.83.
(The court in Computer Science erroneously relied on the district court's analysis of the enterprise
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss2/8
19881 SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS AND RICO
courts adhere to this view.39
The Seventh Circuit reached a compromise between the divergent
holdings of Hartley and Computer Sciences.' In Haroco, Inc. v. Ameri-
can National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago,4 the court agreed with the
Fourth Circuit that a corporation could not be named as both the "per-
son" and the "enterprise" under section 1962(c).42 To better effectuate
the overall purpose of RICO,43 however, the Haroco court held that the
language of section 1962(a)" does permit the corporation to be both a
"person" and the "enterprise" when the corporation is the beneficiary
and not the victim of the crime.45 Because the Supreme Court affirmed
Haroco on other grounds, the disagreement between the circuits remains
unresolved.46
issue. That court used the antitrust doctrine that there is no legal existence for an unincorporated
division separate from the corporation.) Brickey also notes at id §§ 6:11-6:21, that such notions of
intra-enterprise and intra-corporate liability are unique to antitrust conspiracy liability. See also
Brickey, Conspiracy, Group Danger and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 431 (1983).
See supra note 30.
39. See Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986), Bennett v.
United States Trust Co. of New York, 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 800
(1986); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1984); Haroco v. Ameri-
can National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 401-402 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1984); Bennett v.
Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 1982), modified, 710 F.2d 1361 (en bane), cert denied, 464
U.S. 1008 (1983); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 97 (E.D. Penn.
1983); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal. Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1135-1136 (D. Mass.
1982); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
40. See Haas, supra note 32, at 1267-68.
41. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (per curiam).
42. Id. at 402.
43. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
44. Section 1962(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indi-
rectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in
which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1984).
45. Id. See Haas, supra note 32, at 1263-64. The author discusses the difference between
Haroco as a criminal RICO case and Hartley and Computer Sciences as civil RICO cases. He notes
that although the Eighth Circuit is bound by its holding in Bennett favoring Computer Sciences, that
circuit is still free to choose between Hartley and Computer Sciences in criminal RICO cases.
But see Haroco, 747 F.2d at 400. (The court expressly held that the civil-criminal distinction was
irrelevant.)
46. See Haas, supra note 32, at 1260-68.
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In McCullough v. Suter47 the Seventh Circuit distinguished its holding
in Haroco48 to uphold the conviction of a sole proprietor under section
1962(c).49 The defendant and several employees ran a coin investment
scam under a nom de guerre.5° The Court held that a sole proprietorship
may be the "enterprise" with which the proprietor "associates" if the
proprietorship is formally incorporated51 or has other employees.52
The McCullough court recognized that the result would be different if
the sole proprietorship were merely a "one-man show."53 A person can-
not associate with himself, any more than he can conspire with himself,
simply by using a different name.54 Because the defendant had several
employees, however, the court considered his business an enterprise, 55
not just a "one-man band."56 The court regarded this enterprise as dis-
tinct and separate from the defendant sole proprietor, and thereby con-
cluded that a conspiracy could exist under the Haroco rule.5 7 Thus, the
defendant could be reached under section 1962(c).
In United States v. Benny58 the Ninth Circuit broke new ground and
became only the second circuit to deal with the sole proprietorship issue.
The defendant, Benny, argued that because he was a sole proprietorship,
he could not "associate with" that sole proprietorship under section
1962(c); one cannot associate with oneself any more than one can con-
spire with oneself. 9 Benny based his argument on the Computer Sci-
ences and Haroco line of cases, which held that under section 1962(c), a
corporate defendant cannot also be the related "enterprise," that is, a
47. 757 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1985).
48. For a good analysis of the interplay between Haroco and McCullough see United States V.
Dicaro, 772 F.2d 1314, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1985) (if Suter had not had employees, then Haroco would
have precluded liability for him under § 1962(c)).
49. 757 F.2d at 144.
50. Id. at 143. Defendant Suter, under the name National Investment Publishing Company,
advised and bought coins on clients' behalf. Suter received $23,000 to invest and in return sent coins
worth only $10,000. He pleaded guilty to two counts of mal fraud. Id.
51. See infra note 62.
52. 757 F.2d at 144. See Woodbridge, supra note 9, at 518. The author notes that the deep-
pocket theory is what makes publicly held corporations open to accusation as defendants. On the
other hand, closely held or one-person operations do not often get accused as RICO defendants.
Therefore, McCullough is a unique case.
53. 757 F.2d 142, 144.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 9.
56. 757 F.2d 142, 144.
57. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 41-2.
58. 786 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 1415.
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division of a corporation cannot associate with that corporation.'
In response, the Benny court distinguished the cases upon which the
defendant relied.61 The court said those cases factually resemble a sole
proprietorship without employees.62 That is, a sole proprietorship can
no more associate with himself than a corporation can associate with
itself. The court found the facts of Benny distinguishable in that the pro-
prietorship had employees.63 Benny, together with his employees, as a
group "associated in fact," formed an "enterprise" operating under the
name of one of the employees. Because the indictment separated defend-
ant Benny, an individual, from the enterprise, the charge actually com-
plied with the Haroco rule."
The Benny court thus adopted the Seventh Circuit's rule in holding
that a sole proprietorship may be the "enterprise" with which the propri-
etor "associates" if the proprietorship is formally incorporated or has
other employees. 65 The Benny court reasoned that this rule avoids the
untenable result of interpreting RICO to make liable an individual who
associates with himself or herself.66 Simultaneously, the rule helps retain
the "teeth" necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose of deterring and
punishing criminal activity.67
The Benny court's analysis of the sole proprietorship issue is persua-
sive. The court was correct in analogizing the Computer Sciences and
Haroco line of cases to a situation involving a sole proprietorship without
employees.68 A contrary holding would subject the true "one man
60. See supra notes 31-34, 41-2 and accompanying text.
61. 786 F.2d 1410, 1415. Benny relied on Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir.
1984); United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1985); Haroco v. American Na-
tional Bank, 747 F.2d 384, 399-400 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985);
United States v. Computer Sciences, 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1105
(1983).
62, 786 F.2d 1410, 1415-16.
63. See supra note 7.
64. 786 F.2d 1410, 1415. See supra notes 41-2.
65. Id. The facts of Benny required only the part of the rule regarding a proprietorship with
other employees. The court delineated that if the sole proprietor had no employees but operated
under the corporate form, he too could be reached under § 1962(c). The court reasoned that the sole
proprietor in that situation does receive some protection from the corporate form, and this is the
"sort of legal shield for illegal activity that Congress intended RICO to pierce." Id. at 1416.
66. Id.
67. Id. See supra note 14. For a discussion of RICO penalties and their effects, see Wood-
bridge, supra note 9, at 520. See also K. BRICKEY, supra note 14, §§ 7:20-26.
68. See Tarlow, supra note 33, at 345-46.
1988]
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show" operator to unjust culpability for a section 1962(c) offense.69
The court was justified in upholding the conviction of the defendant
Benny. To hold otherwise would lead to results the drafters of the RICO
statute never anticipated.70 The head of a crime ring engaged in a pat-
tern of racketeering activity would merely have to operate as a sole pro-
prietorship to avoid prosecution under section 1962(c). In adopting the
Seventh Circuit's rule regarding the sole proprietorship issue, the Ninth
Circuit convincingly affirmed that holding and signaled the way for other
courts to follow.
S.E.G.
69. See supra notes 53-4, 66 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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